NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON

030501 Security information

SPECIAL EVALUATION SUBCOMMITTEE

Serial No. 01

17 February 1953

Memorandum for the Director of Central Intelligence

Subject:

Request for Special Intelligence Information

NSC 140 Reference:

- 1. It is my understanding that CIA is now preparing an estimate of Soviet capabilities for attack on the US through mid-1955 (SE-36) for the use of this Subcommittee.
- The Special Evaluation Subcommittee has completed a preliminary survey of information needed to complete its mission and requests that the subjects noted in Appendix A be included in SE-36.
- The Subcommittee hopes that the subjects noted will include all which it will require on a coordinated basis, but recognizes that further intelligence may be required as the work of the Subcommittee proceeds.

valds. Lt General, USAF Chairman

Document No. Review of this document by CIA has determined that

CIA has no objection to declass ☐ If comains information of CIA interest that must remain classified at TS

HR 70-2 Authority : 11 contains nothing of CIA interest

Reviewer

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## Assumptions:

- 1. The USSR has decided to attack the US, recognizing that such an attack would precipitate a general war with the US.
- 2. The USSR has concluded that circumstances are such that a general war with the US would be an acceptable method of contributing to its long-range objective of a Communist world dominated by Moscow.

## Special Information Needed:

1. Soviet Mass Destruction Weapons (Atomic, Thermonuclear, BW agents, CW agents).

Types, stockpiles, characteristics.

2. Soviet gross capabilities for delivery of conventional and mass-destruction weapons through the air.

Tumbers, types, characteristics of delivery agents.

Mirfields and bases.

Operational capabilities.

- 3. Soviet gross capabilities for attacking the US with conventional naval and airborne forces.
- 4. Biviet gross capabilities for attacking the US by clandestine means.
- 5. Effect of Soviet capabilities, vulnerabilities, psychological reactions, etc., upon Soviet war objectives and upon the allocation of its military resources in the assumed situation.

Appendix A to SIS Serial Ol dated 17 February 1953.

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SE-36 OP SECRET PDP79501011A000800050001-6 SIGNATURE RECORD AND COVER SHEET DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION REGISTRY SOURCE NSC, Special Evaluation Subcommittee CIA CONTROL NO. DOC. NO. Serial no. Ol 030501 DOC. DATEL 7 Feb 1953 DATE DOCUMENT RECEIVED COPY NO.  $\overline{A-1}$ 17 feb 53 LOGGED BY NUMBER OF PAGES 2 pgs tot NUMBER OF ATTACHMENTS ATTENTION: This form will be attached to each Top Secret document received by the Central Intelligence Agency or classified Top Secret within the CIA and will remain attached to the document until such time as it is downgraded, destroyed, or transmitted outside of CIA. Access to Top Secret material is limited to those individuals whose official duties relate to the material. Each alternate or assistant Top Secret Control Officer who receives and/or releases the attached Top Secret material will sign this form and indicate period of custody in the left-hand columns provided. The name of each individual who has seen the Top Secret document and the date of handling about the left-hand columns provided. REFERRED TO RECEIVED RELEASED OFFICE SIGNATURE TIME DATE TIME NAME AND OFFICE SYMBOL DATE 5 3 20 Feb 7453 25X1A9a ubo 25X1A9a 0933 AL INE **M**ar ADINE Mar 193 25X1A9a 25X1A9a Document Ro. -Baylew of this document by CIA has has no objection to declass eterminet strains information of CIA express that must remain TS Sassified at HB 10-2 confains nothing of GIA interest Reviewer . D218 NOTICE OF DETACHMENT: When this form is detached from Top Secret material it shall be completed in the appropriate spaces below and THE TOP SECRET MATERIAL DETAC 1. PRO HIS FORM WAS: BY (Signature) DOWNGRADED [ This copy has been marie to meet DESTROYED internal needs of CIA. It must not DISPATCHED (OUTSIDE CIA) TO

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